E-Financial
The Collapse of FTX

By Oluseyi Akindeinde
FTX recently valued at $32 billion dollars, has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the US. The filing in Delaware federal court on Friday 11th November, 2022 included the main FTX international exchange, FTX US a US crypto marketplace, Sam Bankman-Fried’s proprietary trading group Alameda Research and about 130 affiliated companies.

In this piece I try to dissect what went wrong at FTX, and discuss possible ramifications for the crypto industry.
The Players
- Sam Bankman-Fried aka SBF (The self proclaimed Crypto White Knight and member of the inner caucus. Darling of Washington DC).
- Caroline Ellison aka CE (His Girlfriend).
- Changpeng Zhao aka CZ (The Outcast Dark Crypto Lord).
The Entities
- Alameda Research (AR). The Trading company founded and OWNED by SBF but managed by CE. Revenue earned through market making (ie providing liquidity to crypto exchanges) as well as trading/speculating on cryptocurrency futures using a high degree of leverage.
– FTX (FTX.com). Cryptocurrency
Futures Exchange (brokerage and derivatives platform) OWNED and CONTROLLED by SBF. Revenue earned through customer transaction fees who trade and speculate on cryptocurrency futures and derivatives(day traders). The trading platform was called FTXPro.
– Binance. A rival crypto Exchange OWNED & CONTROLLED by CZ. The Biggest cryptocurrency spot exchange in the world by volume.
Quick Summary
- AR and FTX were meant to be separate entities even though they were founded by the same person SBF.
– FTX had a market-cap (networth) of $32 billion having raised funding from well known
VCs in Silicon Valley including Sequoia Capital.
- AR allegedly owed FTX $8 billion after taking loans apparently funded by deposits of FTX customers.
- AR used these borrowed funds to trade cryptocurrencies with leverage and also to bail out struggling crypto companies (Voyager and BlockFI) who had liquidity issues.
– FTX declared bankruptcy with loads of customer funds gone with it.
How Money Disappeared – Summary
– SBF founded AR and FTX.
– FTX also issued FTT tokens which they gave to early investors that included AR.
– As an exchange, customers deposited their funds on FTX to trade with.
– SBF basically gave these customer deposits to AR as loans to be used for their trading activities and in return accepted FTT tokens (originally issued by FTX) as collateral for the loan.
– A report then came out that pointed out that AR’s balance sheet was basically made up largely of FTT tokens issued by FTX.
– CZ (who once bought a stake in FTX but later divested because he had a bone to pick with SBF) upon getting wind of this development announced he would de-risk his entire $500M of FTT position.
- On the back of this, other customers also started to dump their FTT tokens and immediately started withdrawing their funds on FTX. It led to a bank run.
- AR then started selling assets presumably on other exchanges to send back to FTX to shore up capital in order to meet the customer shortfall.
- When SBF realized the liquidity squeeze, he then reached out to CZ for a bail out of FTX wherein CZ accepted the offer of bail out subject to corporate due diligence.
- CZ later pulled out of the deal because his due diligence on FTX had come up short.
- FTT price tanked as FTX had no liquidity in reserve to meet customer withdrawal obligations and subsequently paused withdrawals.
– From being illiquid, FTX became insolvent since the value of the collateral held (FTT) had fallen below the value of their liabilities.
- SBF basically thought he could print money (FTT) out of thin-air using FTX as the mechanism and use it as collateral against real assets.
- FTX, AR and SBF filed for bankruptcy protection post- haste.
How Money Disappeared – Details
Background
- SBF, an MIT physics graduate and a former Wall Street futures trader made a lot of money trading crypto arbitrage. He founded AR but gave CE the reins of power when he founded FTX a crypto futures and derivates trading company.
- FTX as part of its operations issued a token called FTT. It is like airline miles or reward points as you don’t get any ownership stake in FTX itself.
- FTT token allowed the holder to obtain discounts on trading fees when they trade on FTXPro. It could also be pledged as collateral for futures trading on FTXPro.
- FTX used a portion of profits (trading fees) generated to buy back and burn a portion of FTT in circulation.
- So indirectly FTT token was tied to the profitability of FTX – that is the more profitable FTX was, the more FTT tokens FTX would buy back leading to an increase in the price of the FTT tokens (the reverse was also the case if FTX wasn’t profitable).
– Burning FTT would also lead to reducing its supply which further increases its price. This also made FTT behave somewhat like a company stock. But it wasn’t legally a stock.
– There were over 400,000 holders of FTT at the last count.
– Word got out about AR’s balance sheet which had $14.6 billion but it’s biggest asset was
$3.7bn worth of “unlocked FTT” and its other biggest asset was
$2.2bn worth of FTT that were pledged as collateral. Basically nearly half of AR’s balance sheet was made up of FTT tokens – an asset created by FTX.
- AR’s balance sheet liability also carried $7.4bn worth of liabilities (loans).
- From purely a risk management point of view, this was rather bad because AR was using it’s own equity as collateral for borrowed money. If the company became unprofitable, this would be bad in itself but if the collateral (FTT tokens) backing those loans were to fall in value, this would become a disaster for AR.
Relationship Between FTX and AR
- SBF founded both companies. FTX being the exchange. AR was the trading company using FTX to conduct its trading activities.
- FTX and AR claimed they were completely separate entities. Speculation however started to spread on social media that the two companies were one and the same and customer funds on FTX were finding their way to AR behind the scenes.
– It was later gathered that FTT token’s price was being propped up by AR. Not only that, AR was further using FTT it got issued by FTX as collateral to the same FTX to fund its own operations.
– It was bad enough that AR carried a lot of illiquid assets on their books (FTT), it became even worse when FTX started giving a huge portion of their customer funds to AR as loans which were collateralised and secured by the very same FTT tokens issued by FTX.
– Remember that FTX issued FTT tokens in the first place. So, they were getting back what they issued as collateral. Like plugging an extension plug into itself. Simply means if the price of FTT went down, FTX would be seriously impacted.
Crisis Brewing
- FTX’s primarily business was being a broker dealer. They were listing and selling
perpetual crypto futures and allowing AR and other traders/ speculators to trade crypto derivatives often with huge leverage.
- As a result, they needed a reserve of money to lend to AR and speculators.
- And because FTX and AR were one and the same, customer funds deposited on FTX were diverted to AR for leveraged trading operations.
- Once suspicion started to filter
through that FTX didn’t have enough crypto on hand to honour all customer withdrawals, customers started demanding for their funds and FTX started having liquidity issues as there wasn’t enough reserve on hand to meet up with customer’s withdrawals.
- AR in turn started withdrawing funds (stable coins and crypto)
they had on other exchanges to send to FTX. This served to further confirm that FTX was really facing a liquidity crisis.
Denials
- SBF denied the liquidity crisis and basically said everything was fine and customer funds were intact. He even claimed it was all the work of competitors trying to spook them.
- At the same time CE (who ran AR) took to twitter to say that AR had $10bn in liquidity not reported on the balance sheet.
Enter CZ
- CZ who was a former investor in FTX had over $500M worth of FTT. It was paid in part as
settlement when CZ divested from FTX in 2021.
- Actually SBF bought back CZ’s stake in FTX and paid him $2.1bn in BUSD and FTT tokens.
- When CZ got wind of the report of AR’s balance sheet and its asset makeup, he made a public declaration to offload his entire $500M worth of FTT in what he called a “de-risking” process.
- This piece of public declaration naturally spooked the markets as speculators who held FTT tokens started de-risking (selling) as well.
The Death Spiral
- With speculators selling, FTT price began to plummet.
- It was made worse when CE incredibly made a public offer to CZ that AR were willing to buy Binance’s entire FTT stake at $22 each over-the-counter.
- This further fuelled the fire that AR and FTX were using FTT as collateral for crypto loans and feared getting liquidated.
- This caused hundreds of millions of dollars in FTT liquidations on FTX and because
of low liquidity it further crashed the price. AR and FTX also started selling off the other crypto assets they held to prevent FTX from collapsing.
This caused other cryptocurrency prices to tank. A ripple effect.
- Traders also started rushing to pull their funds off FTX exchange for fear that the exchange would collapse. This essentially led to a bank run.
The Aborted Rescue Mission
- People just couldn’t believe that FTX, a company that had raised a combined $1.8bn in VC money could be facing insolvency.
- The unthinkable then happened – SBF publicly reached out to CZ and asked to be bailed out.
- CZ accepted by signing a non- binding letter of intent (LoI) to buy FTX pending due diligence.
This served to further confirm that FTX was indeed neck deep in trouble.
- The following day, however, CZ through Binance made it known that they wouldn’t be taking up the offer of buying FTX as the issues were simply too many.
FTX had failed their process of corporate due diligence.
Binance also cited risks related to pending regulatory investigations on FTX and reports of internal FTX funds mismanagement.
- FTX then paused withdrawals of customer funds. There was already an $8bn shortfall.
- SBF attempted a last ditch effort at raising funds but no offer of a bail-out was forthcoming.
Bankruptcy Filing
- FTX and AR are now insolvent and SBF has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
- They imploded in a wave of scuttlebutt and were brought down in truly exceptional circumstances.
- The fallout of this is still unravelling and will most likely take a few months to sort out. Until then there will still be blood on the crypto streets so tread with caution. Brace yourselves for more bloodbath.
- A lot of people lost loads of money on FTX. Here’s a Never leave your funds on an Exchange. Get a non-custodial wallet and move your funds there. Exchanges are centralized entities.
Wrap up
Naturally people will be more skeptical of crypto but this, in fact isn’t crypto problem.
This was caused by a few self- absorbed, irresponsible and incompetent individuals like SBF and CE running centralised entities engaging in blackbox-like business practices, mis-using customer funds to run opaque financial institutions under a cloak of invincibility with no oversight regulation.
These guys basically ran a huge fraudulent operation which could have gone undetected for a long time.
The system needs sanitization. Some regulation needs to be enforced to bring a semblance of order to the industry.
A lot of Nigerians lost money in this debacle and I truly sympathize with you if you did. These are truly extraordinary times.
At the end of the day nothing is wrong with crypto. It’s just a medium and a tool in the hands of nefarious individuals. Going forward though, always remember: Not your keys. Not your coins.
I round off with these words from CZ

Oluseyi Akindeinde is the Chief Technology Officer, Digital Encode.
E-Financial
Bank Customers to Pay N1,500 for ATM Card Issuance, Replacement – CBN

Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has said that the cost of issuing or replacing a standard debit or credit card will rise by 50 percent to about N1,500, up from about N1,000.

The new charge is contained in the Exposure Draft of the Guide to Charges by Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria, 2026, released by the Central Bank of Nigeria.
The draft followed a circular issued to banks, other financial institutions and the public, dated April 21, 2026, and signed by Rita I. Sike, director, Financial Policy and Regulation Department.
Under the revised guide, issuance and replacement of regular or basic debit and credit cards will attract a N1,500 fee, while charges for premium debit, credit or hybrid cards will be negotiable.
In the 2020 guide, debit card charges were fixed at N1,000 as a one-off fee for issuance, replacement of lost or damaged cards, and renewal upon expiry, applicable across all card types.
The CBN said the review is part of its mandate to promote a safe and sound financial system, accelerate the adoption of innovative financial services, and enhance financial inclusion, particularly in micropayments and transactions.
According to the regulator, the revised guide expands the range of financial services, encourages innovation, strengthens oversight and accountability, and promotes financial inclusion through lower tariffs for micropayments. It also updates certain banking charges to support increased use of electronic channels and accommodate new industry participants since the 2020 version.
The apex bank said the draft has been exposed to the public for comments and input on the proposed fees, with submissions expected via [email protected] on or before May 08, 2026.
The guide provides a framework for the application of charges, including fees and rates, on products and services offered by financial institutions in Nigeria. It applies to all institutions licensed or regulated by the Central Bank of Nigeria.
The charges, according to the regulator, were developed following extensive consultations with stakeholders and are aimed at enhancing flexibility, standardisation, transparency and competition in the financial system.
It added that where charges are designated as negotiable, financial institutions must inform customers of their right to negotiate at the start of transactions and reach mutual agreement on applicable fees through verifiable means.
Where limits are specified, charges must not exceed the prescribed maximum or fall below the minimum.
The apex bank noted that the guide is not exhaustive and that financial institutions must seek prior approval before introducing new products, services or charges not covered.
The framework applies to a wide range of institutions, including commercial banks, merchant banks, payment service banks, non-interest banks, microfinance banks, finance companies, primary mortgage banks, development finance institutions, credit guarantee companies, mobile money operators, and other institutions designated by the regulator.
In line with existing consumer protection regulations, the apex bank said non-credit charges can only be applied to the extent of the available account balance, with any outstanding fees deferred until the account is funded. Such deferred charges will not attract interest.
The guide is to be read alongside the relevant guidance notes and glossary provisions and will supersede the 2020 version when it takes effect on May 1, 2026.
E-Financial
ProvidusBank Launches Ado-Ekiti Branch, Eyes Nationwide Rollout

ProvidusBank Plc has commissioned a new branch in Ado-Ekiti, advancing its expansion strategy across Nigeria’s high-growth markets while leveraging its compliance with the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) recapitalisation directive since January 2025.

ProvidusBank
The move aims to enhance financial inclusion, support local enterprises, and deliver banking services closer to communities and businesses.
At the event, Executive Director/Chief Financial Officer, Deoye Ojuroye, described the rollout as part of a 12-month plan to bolster the bank’s nationwide presence.
“Our approach is deliberate—we are growing in the right places, supporting real economic activity, and building a bank that is both resilient and responsive to customer needs,” Ojuroye said.
He emphasised the bank’s robust capital and risk management, stating: “We are well capitalised within our regulatory category, giving us confidence to expand responsibly while aiding businesses and communities.”
ProvidusBank plans further branches in strategic locations over the next year, underscoring its focus on scalability, accessibility, and sustainable growth as a trusted partner for individuals and enterprises.
E-Financial
Fidelity Bank Bolsters SME Growth with April Masterclass Series on Pricing, Digital Tools, Global Trade

Fidelity Bank Plc has launched a series of high-impact masterclasses in April 2026 to empower Nigerian Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) with practical skills for pricing, digital expansion, and international growth.

Fidelity Bank
The initiative aligns with the bank’s drive to boost SME operational efficiency and market access amid Nigeria’s economic challenges.
The flagship session, “Pricing That Works: How to Charge Right and Earn More,” took place on April 10 at the Fidelity SME Hub in Gbagada, Lagos. It drew about 100 entrepreneurs from diverse sectors, offering insights into costing, value-based pricing, pricing psychology, and customer perception to ensure profitable, customer-friendly strategies.
Buoyed by positive feedback, the bank rolled out three more sessions. The second, “Baking Masterclass: From Kitchen to Cashflow,” ran on April 14 and 15, providing hands-on training for bakers and food businesses to enhance product quality and profitability.
Divisional Head, SME Banking, Ugochi Osinigwe, stated: “At Fidelity Bank, we believe that when SMEs succeed, the economy grows. That is why we have curated masterclasses on pricing, product improvement, online sales, and global expansion to equip entrepreneurs with immediate, actionable tools.”
She highlighted the series as part of broader SME support via the Fidelity SME Hub, including advisory services, funding, and nationwide programmes. The bank recently earned the Best Retail and SME Bank Award from Independent Newspapers.
Upcoming events include “Grow Online Sales on a Budget” today, April 24, focusing on low-cost digital strategies for visibility and sales; and “Take Your Business Global: One-on-One Trade Advisory” on April 29, covering export readiness, payments, markets, and compliance.
Fidelity Bank, ranked among Nigeria’s top lenders, serves over 10 million customers via 255 branches, digital platforms, and its UK subsidiary, FidBank UK Limited. It has clinched awards like the 2024 Excellence in Digital Transformation & MSME Banking from BusinessDay BAFI Awards, Most Innovative Mobile Banking App from Global Business Outlook, Best Bank for SMEs from Euromoney, and Export Financing Bank of the Year from BusinessDay BAFI.
Telecom3 days agoNCC Orders Telcos to Give Users Free Airtime for Poor Network Service
Telecom2 days agoNCC Blames Growing Data Demand Network Quality Issues
Telecom3 days agoMTN to Pay Subscribers After NCC Cracks Down on Service Failures
E-Financial3 days agoEXPLOSIVE: How Titan Trust Bank Allegedly Used Union Bank’s Own Assets to Fund Its Takeover
E-Financial2 days agoBank Customers to Pay N1,500 for ATM Card Issuance, Replacement – CBN
E-Financial2 days agoATM Card Fees Jump to ₦1,500 as CBN Scraps Maintenance Charges
E-Business2 days agoKaspersky Discovers Vulnerability in Qualcomm Snapdragon Chips that can Lead to Data Loss & Device Compromise
News2 days agoCADEF, Stakeholders Push for Zero Added Sugar Standards in Infant Foods











