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CBN Made Critical Mistakes that Doomed its Currency Redesign

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By Stephen Onyeiwu

Nigeria has successfully introduced new banknotes on about 10 occasions since independence in 1960. So why has the latest attempt been so controversial and traumatic? And what measures need to be taken to avoid a future debacle?

CBN Made Critical Mistakes that Doomed its Currency Redesign

Godwin Emefiele

Nigeria’s central bank announced the introduction of new banknotes last November, with the changeover to new notes scheduled for mid-December.

The rollout of the policy disintegrated into chaos, amid mounting anger among ordinary Nigerians.

The rollout of the currency change was disastrous. The fallout included:

  • Severe shortages of the new banknotes.
  • Precipitous declines in business transactions (especially in the informal sector).
  • Long queues at bank premises and overcrowded banking halls
  • Attacks on bank staff and destruction of bank property, including ATMs that failed to dispense cash.

The policy also led to lawsuits by some state governors against the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Federal Government.

I have identified five factors that marred the redesign policy, most of which could have been avoided by the Central Bank of Nigeria.

Litany of errors

Cost-benefit: An egregious error committed by the central bank was its violation of the principle of cost-benefit analysis. This is a simple rule in economics that implores policy makers to undertake an initiative only when the benefits exceed the costs. One should ask: What were the benefits of introducing the policy? What were the potential costs at the time of implementation?

The central bank justified the redesign policy as follows: to rein in counterfeiting, promote a cashless economy by limiting the amount of the new banknotes that can be withdrawn, reduce the large quantity of dirty notes circulating in the economy, discourage hoarding, curb crimes like kidnapping and terrorism, and head off illicit financial transactions.

It also saw the policy as a way of addressing the huge amount of currency outside the formal financial sector; 85% of banknotes circulate outside the banking system, largely because of hoarding and illicit financial transactions.

And the cost? If indeed the central bank considered the cost, it obviously underestimated it. How would anyone ignore the large-scale disruptions in the economy and loss of productivity that the policy caused, not to speak of the stress and anxiety inflicted on Nigerians?

Communication: Of all the pitfalls that doomed the currency redesign policy, at least as conceived originally, the lack of effective communication about the overarching goals and modus operandi of the exercise was the most devastating.

Nigeria’s central bank threw a basic element of strategic planning and communication to the winds when it failed woefully to communicate and educate the public about expectations, prior to launching the policy. According to strategic planners, a major policy initiative that is not well communicated, from the top of the strategy planning pyramid to the bottom, is bound to fail.

The central bank should have sought the buy-in of major stakeholders, especially the National Economic Council and the National Assembly. The central bank would have had a better chance of avoiding the ferocious push-back it got.

The central bank finally began rolling out a communication plan by late December 2022. But this was too little too late. By then Nigerians had already characterised the policy as decidedly punitive. The narrative that had gained ground was that the change was designed to curtail the ability of politicians to buy votes during the 2023 elections.

This inevitably raised the question of why millions of Nigerians should suffer because of politicians?

The central bank’s mishandling of communication was also manifested in the fact that it failed to issue policy guidelines to commercial banks and the public days after the Supreme Court nullified the bank’s earlier deadline. This has exacerbated the confusion associated with the policy, as merchants and businesses continue to reject the old notes, despite the court’s rulings.

Inappropriate timeframe: The timeframe for implementation was unrealistic and impracticable. By setting a very short timeframe for phasing out the old notes, the Central Bank of Nigeria appeared to have adopted textbook assumptions about how the Nigerian banking system works.

Anyone who has been to a typical commercial bank in Nigeria would know it would have been impossible for the banks to undertake the monumental task of collecting old notes and dispensing the new ones within the one-and-a-half month window originally allowed by the central bank. Overcrowding, chaos, excruciatingly slow service and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape are quite common during normal banking hours. It is not uncommon to observe people with “connection” circumvent queues and obtain preferential access to bank staff. Although Nigerian banks pride themselves as being digitised, a lot of paper-pushing still goes on within the banking system.

The central bank should have considered this fact and allowed for a longer timeframe for implementation.

There was also no persuasive rationale for the rushed implementation of the policy. Neither was the central bank able to explain why the old and new notes could not coexist, a measure the Supreme Court has now mandated the bank to implement.

Conflicting goals and lack of prioritisation: Policy targeting is a major precondition for success. The focus on one unambiguous objective in past redesign policies enabled the central bank to conduct a seamless and less dramatic exercise.

The current redesign policy had too many goals, and it was unclear which one was the target goal.

Identifying target goals enables policy makers to select appropriate instruments for achieving those goals. But when there are too many goals, the danger is that an instrument designed for one goal may undermine another goal.

For instance, the goal of reining in money laundering and illicit financial transactions meant that the Central Bank of Nigeria needed to deliberately restrict access to the new banknotes. But this inflicted unintended hardships on innocent Nigerians who simply wanted to access their hard-earned money.

The central bank should have focused on one major goal. If the goal was to phase out old notes, as the bank is statutorily mandated to do, then the old and new notes could have circulated alongside each other until the old notes were phased out.

A casual announcement that new notes would be circulating from a given date would have been all that was needed. People would not have panicked and rushed to the banks to withdraw money.

Economic headwinds: It is very difficult to implement a major policy initiative that negatively affects people during a period of macroeconomic instability. The central bank policy came at a bad time. Nigeria’s economy is in a shambles, with a 22% inflation rate, 33% unemployment rate – 43% among young Nigerians – and a growth rate of 3%.

These economic challenges have been compounded by a 17.5% interest rate, steep declines in the value of the Naira, and widespread poverty.

Nigerians’ tolerance for economic shocks was already at its limit when the redesign policy was launched. The policy and the confusion that accompanied it tipped them over the edge.

The challenge of credibility

The central bank needs to reestablish its credibility as the “people’s bank,” to reverse a self-inflicted image of an organisation that’s partisan.

The bank has a fiduciary responsibility of catering to the interests of its main “shareholder,” the Nigerian people. But the perception is that the bank lacks independence. To effectively discharge its statutory duties, the Central Bank of Nigeria should initiate a process of re-asserting its independence and regaining the people’s trust and confidence.

Stephen Onyeiwu is professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College

This article is republished from The Conversation  Read the original article.

 


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E-Financial

KPMG Identifies ‘Flaws, Inconsistencies, and Omission’ in New Tax Law

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KPMG Nigeria has identified what’s described as “errors, inconsistencies, gaps and omissions” in Nigeria’s tax laws that came into force at the beginning of this year.

The professional services company warns that these issues could undermine the attainment of the tax reforms’ stated objectives if left unaddressed.

The reforms, anchored on the Nigeria Tax Act (NTA) and the Nigeria Tax Administration Act (NTAA), alongside the Nigeria Revenue Service (NRS)  Establishment Act and the Joint Revenue Board (JRB) Establishment Act, are aimed at improving revenue generation, simplifying tax administration, and enhancing competitiveness.

Authorities have repeatedly described the overhaul as critical to strengthening Nigeria’s weak tax-to-GDP ratio and adapting the tax system to changing economic realities.

Capital gains, inflation, and market behaviour

One of the most far-reaching concerns relates to the computation of chargeable gains under Sections 39 and 40 of the Nigeria Tax Act, which require capital gains to be calculated as the difference between sale proceeds and the tax-written-down value of assets, without any adjustment for inflation, analysis by KPMG revealed.

This approach has attracted attention largely because of Nigeria’s inflation environment. Headline inflation has remained in double digits for eight consecutive years, averaging above 18 percent between 2022 and 2025, according to data from the National Bureau of Statistics. Over the same period, asset price movements have been heavily influenced by currency depreciation and general price increases.

Actual market behaviour shows a mixed reaction to tax policy expectations, despite a strong full‑year rally, with the NGX All‑Share Index up more than 50  percent and market capitalisation near N99.4 trillion, the equities market saw significant sell‑offs in late 2025, including a N6.5 trillion drop in market value in November amid uncertainty over the new capital gains tax rules, underscoring investor sensitivity to tax policy shifts.

In its review of the law, KPMG Nigeria noted that taxing nominal gains in a high-inflation environment could result in taxpayers being assessed on inflationary gains rather than real economic value. The firm recommended the introduction of a cost indexation allowance to adjust asset values for inflation when computing chargeable gains.

According to the analysis, such an adjustment would reduce distortions in effective tax rates while still allowing the government to generate additional revenue from genuine capital appreciation.

Indirect transfer rules and foreign investment risks

Another provision drawing scrutiny is Section 47 of the Nigeria Tax Act, which subjects gains from indirect transfers of shares or assets by non-residents to Nigerian tax where such transfers result in changes in ownership of Nigerian companies or assets located in Nigeria.

The provision is being introduced amid weak foreign investment inflows. Data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development shows that foreign direct investment into Nigeria remains below pre-2019 levels, reflecting broader investor caution.

While similar indirect transfer rules exist in other jurisdictions, analysts note that such regimes are typically supported by detailed guidance and clear thresholds to reduce uncertainty.

KPMG’s analysis recommended that Nigerian tax authorities issue clear administrative guidance defining the scope, thresholds, and reporting obligations associated with indirect transfers. The firm noted that clarity would reduce the risk of disputes, improve compliance, and mitigate potential negative effects on foreign investment flows.

FX deductions clash with economic realities

Section 24 of the Nigeria Tax Act limits businesses from deducting foreign-currency expenses beyond their naira equivalent at the official CBN rate.

In practice, this means a company importing goods, paying foreign software subscriptions, or settling overseas vendor invoices cannot claim as tax-deductible any amount they spent above the official exchange rate.

For many companies, this is a real problem. Access to official foreign exchange is limited, forcing businesses to pay higher rates on the parallel market. Under the law, the extra cost becomes non-deductible, effectively increasing taxable profits and raising their tax bills.

KPMG warns that while the rule aims to curb speculative foreign exchange activity, it fails to account for supply shortages. The firm recommends that deductibility should reflect the actual cost incurred, provided proper documentation, so businesses aren’t penalized for circumstances beyond their control.

VAT-linked expense disallowances

Section 21(p) of the Nigeria Tax Act disallows deductions for expenses on which value-added tax has not been charged, even where such expenses were incurred wholly for business purposes.

This intersects with Nigeria’s VAT compliance challenges. The informal sector accounts for a significant share of economic activity, and VAT compliance gaps remain wide, according to assessments by tax authorities and development institutions.

Analysts note that the provision effectively transfers part of the VAT enforcement burden to compliant taxpayers, who may be penalised for supplier non-compliance.

KPMG recommended that Section 21(p) be deleted or substantially modified, arguing that deductibility should depend solely on whether an expense was wholly, exclusively, and necessarily incurred for business purposes. The firm noted that VAT compliance should instead be enforced directly through audits and penalties on defaulting suppliers.

Non-resident taxation and compliance ambiguity

Uncertainty also surrounds the compliance obligations of non-resident companies. While Section 17 of the Nigeria Tax Act provides that withholding tax constitutes final tax for certain non-resident payments where there is no permanent establishment or significant economic presence, the Nigeria Tax Administration Act does not clearly exempt such entities from registration or filing requirements.

Nigeria has signed over a dozen double taxation treaties (DTTs), including the UK, South Africa, Canada, and France, which align with the principle that final WHT extinguishes further tax obligations in the absence of a taxable presence. Experts say harmonizing the NTA and NTAA with these treaties is critical to avoid conflicts and deter foreign investors.

KPMG recommended that the relevant provisions of the Nigeria Tax Act and the Nigeria Tax Administration Act be harmonised, with explicit exemptions for non-resident companies whose Nigerian tax obligations have been fully discharged through withholding tax. According to the firm, such alignment would reduce compliance friction and improve Nigeria’s attractiveness for cross-border transactions.

As Nigeria enacts its most comprehensive tax overhaul in decades, the path to success will depend on clarity, alignment with international best practices, and swift adoption of recommended amendments. Without these measures, businesses may face higher costs, non-residents could be discouraged from investing, and capital markets may remain volatile. For policymakers, the challenge is not just raising revenue but ensuring that the reforms strengthen competitiveness and sustainable economic growth.


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19 Nigerian Banks Meet CBN Recapitalization Targets Ahead of March Deadline

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Nineteen Nigerian banks have fulfilled the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) recapitalization requirements as of January 6, 2026, six weeks before the March 31 deadline, according to data from The Cable Index.

19 Nigerian Banks Meet CBN Recapitalization Targets Ahead of March Deadline

CBN

Access Bank, Fidelity Bank, First Bank, GTBank (GTCO), UBA, and Zenith Bank—holders of international licenses—lead compliance among six major players.

National and regional licensees Citibank Nigeria, Ecobank Nigeria, Globus Bank, Stanbic IBTC, Sterling Bank, Wema Bank, PremiumTrust Bank, and Providus Bank have also hit the benchmarks.

Two non-interest banks, Jaiz and Lotus, alongside merchant banks FSDH, Greenwich, and Nova, round out the compliant group, meeting thresholds of N10-N20 billion for non-interest, N50 billion for merchants, N200 billion for nationals, and N500 billion for international banks as set in March 2024.

Approximately 14 banks remain non-compliant, underscoring urgency ahead of the deadline despite broad progress.


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BVN Enrollment Up 6.87 Percent to 67.84m in 2025 – NIBSS

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Bank Verification Number (BVN) enrollments in the country rose by 6.87 per cent , or 4.36 million, to 67.84 million as at the end of December 2025 from 63.48 million in the corresponding period of the preceding year, according to latest data released by the Nigeria Interbank Settlement System (NIBSS).

BVN Enrollment Up 6.87 Percent to 67.84m in 2025 - NIBSS

This means that a total number of 4.36 million BVN enrolments were recorded between the end of December 2024 and the end of last year.

The BVN scheme was launched on February 14, 2014 by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in collaboration with the Bankers’ Committee, NIBSS and the German firm, Dermalog, with the aim of capturing biometrics of all bank customers and giving each bank customer a unique 11-digit identity number (BVN) that can be verified across the Nigerian banking industry.

Lamido Sanusi, governor of the CBN, at the time, said at the event that the BVN scheme would enable the apex bank to significantly reduce incidents of fraud and money laundering in the banking industry and also help accelerate financial inclusion by opening up opportunities for credit to millions of Nigerians who do not have a standard means of identification.

In October 2017, the CBN released a regulatory framework for BVN operations and Watchlist for the financial system. It stated that the Watchlist comprises a database of bank customers identified by their BVNs, who have been involved in confirmed fraudulent activities in the Nigerian banking industry.

An analysis of the latest NIBSS data shows that BVN enrollment maintained an upward trend in the last five years, rising from 51.90 million in 2021 to 56.90 million and 60.12 million in 2022 and 2023 respectively, before hitting 63.48 million in 2024 and 67.84 in 2025.

Analysts attribute the rise in BVN enrolments in recent years to policy measures introduced by the CBN as part of its efforts to tackle fraud.

For instance, on December 1, 2023, the apex bank issued a circular directing Deposit money banks (DMBs) Non-interest banks, Payment Service Banks, other financial institutions and mobile operators, to ensure that all funded bank accounts or wallets, without BVN or National Identification Number (NIN) are placed on “Post No Debit or Credit,” by April 1, 2024.


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