By Blaise Udunze

When President Bola Tinubu presented the N58.18 trillion 2026 Appropriation Bill to the National Assembly, unbeknownst to some, it opened with a contradiction that should unsettle even its most optimistic readers. It is an irony that a budget promises consolidation, renewed resilience, and shared prosperity, at the same time, it is built on a deficit of N23.85 trillion, as the largest budget in the nation’s history, equivalent to 4.28 percent of GDP, financed largely through borrowing, and debt servicing alone will consume N15.52 trillion, nearly half of the projected revenue.

President Tinubu

What a contradiction! The reality today is that Nigeria is borrowing not primarily to expand productive capacity or unlock long-term growth, but to keep the machinery of the state running. Salaries, overheads, inherited liabilities, and interest payments increasingly define the purpose of new debt. Capital formation, though loudly advertised, struggles to keep pace with fiscal reality. This raises a fundamental and unavoidable question. How sustainable is a fiscal model where debt service crowds out development spending year after year? Until this question is convincingly answered, no amount of reform rhetoric can restore confidence in Nigeria’s budgeting process.

A Nation Drowning in Deficits and Debt

The problem with the deficit is that it is not a number by itself. It shows that there are problems with the way things are set up. By the middle of 2025, Nigeria owed a lot of money, N152.4 trillion, which represented about a 348.6 percent increase following the assumption of President Bola Tinubu into office in 2023. Before he assumed office, the country owed N33.3 trillion, and this is a country that was already having trouble paying for basic things it needed to.

Reflecting on Nigeria’s predicament, it mirrors a wider African crisis. Reviewing the occurrences across the continent of Africa, external debt now surpassed $1.3 trillion, while the debt servicing costs are estimated at $89 billion this year alone. Nigeria’s case is unique not because of the amount of debt, but because of its poor productive return. The lingering challenge is that Nigeria’s borrowing has skyrocketed, yet the economy remains conspicuously faced with fragile infrastructure. The fiscal irony is stark that Nigeria is borrowing to survive, not to thrive.

A Deficit-Fuelled Budget and the Rising Cost of Survival

Deficits can be useful tools when deployed strategically. But Nigeria’s deficits have become structural, persistent, and increasingly divorced from growth outcomes. The N23.85 trillion deficit in the 2026 budget represents a dramatic escalation from the N11-N12 trillion range of recent years. Analysts warn that this is no longer a counter-cyclical policy; it is a sign of fiscal stress. Tilewa Adebajo, Chief Executive Officer of CFG Advisory, describes Nigeria’s fiscal space as “the biggest threat to our economic recovery.” According to him, the country continues to expand its budget despite failing to meet revenue targets. “We cannot have a N23 trillion deficit, that’s not sustainable,” he warned, noting that deficits have doubled in just a few years. More troubling is what the deficit implies. With N15.52 trillion earmarked for debt servicing, nearly half of the projected revenue is already spoken for before development spending begins. Some estimates suggest that over 25 percent of Nigeria’s annual revenue now goes directly into debt servicing, and in certain months, the ratio rises far higher. Experts warn that when over 90 percent of revenue is consumed by old debts, governance becomes an exercise in survival rather than progress. This is the fiscal corner Nigeria is steadily backing itself into.

Borrowing to Run Government, Not to Build the Economy

Between July and October 2025 alone, Nigeria secured over $24.79 billion in new borrowings, alongside €4 billion, ¥15 billion, N757 billion, $500 million in sukuk, and other facilities, most justified as “development financing.” Yet the real sector continues to wait for a tangible impact. The African Democratic Congress (ADC) argues that a budget planning to generate N34 trillion in revenue while borrowing nearly N24 trillion amounts to an admission of fiscal insolvency. A deficit-to-revenue ratio approaching 70 percent, it insists, would be unacceptable in any functional fiscal system. While opposition language is often sharp, the underlying concern is valid. Borrowing makes economic sense only when it finances self-liquidating projects like investments that generate revenue to repay the loans. Instead, Nigeria increasingly borrows to service past debts and plug recurrent expenditure gaps. Uche Uwaleke, Professor of Finance and Capital Markets at Nasarawa State University, underscores the danger: “Nigeria’s debt service ratio is inimical to economic development, chiefly because what could have been used to build infrastructure and invest in human capital is used to service debt. The opportunity cost for the country is high.” In effect, debt has shifted from a development instrument to a fiscal life support system.

Revenue Projections Caught Between Reform Ambition and Structural Limits

The Nigerian government projected N34.33 trillion in revenue for 2026, which is squarely anchored on improved oil output, non-oil tax reforms, and digitised revenue mobilisation across Government-Owned Enterprises (GOEs). To actualize its target, President Tinubu vowed to clamp down on leakages, enforce performance targets, and deploy real-time monitoring systems. Though these reforms are necessary. The question is whether they are sufficient and timely. Recent performance suggests caution. As at Q3 2025, only 61 percent of revenue targets had been achieved. Capital releases lagged sharply, and comprehensive implementation reports have not been published. Ayokunle Olubunmi, Head of Financial Institutions Ratings at Agusto & Co., expressed doubts about the credibility of the projections, citing weak performance in 2024 and 2025. “We don’t even know how many budgets we are implementing now,” Olubunmi observed, pointing to overlapping cycles and missing reports. The ADC goes further, describing revenue projections as detached from reality, while noting that revenue growth in 2024 was largely driven by currency devaluation, not structural expansion, before being doubled for 2025 and increased again for 2026. Nominal gains, it argues, are being mistaken for real fiscal strength. Without deep structural reforms, reliable power, export diversification, and productivity growth, revenue expansion risks remaining inflationary and fragile, unable to support the scale of spending proposed.

Budget Execution and the Credibility Gap

President Tinubu has declared 2026 a turning point. He promised an end to overlapping budgets, abandoned projects, and perpetual rollovers. All prior capital liabilities, he said, will be closed by March 31, 2026, ushering in a single budget cycle. Yet Nigeria’s execution record invites skepticism. The Coalition of United Opposition Political Parties (CUPP) points out that no comprehensive 2025 budget implementation report has been published, the first such lapse in 15 years. Quarterly performance reports, once routine, have been withheld, violating fiscal responsibility norms. “How can a new budget be proposed when the performance of the current one remains unknown?” CUPP asked. Execution failure is not cosmetic; it is costly. Projects stall, costs balloon, and borrowed funds yield no returns. Without transparency and enforcement, discipline risks becoming a slogan rather than a system.

Capital Spending vs the Persistent Cost of Governance

The N26.08 trillion allocated to capital expenditure is one of the budget’s most advertised strengths, with infrastructure, agriculture, education, and health featuring prominently. Yet Nigeria’s history cautions against equating allocations with outcomes. Recurrent non-debt expenditure remains high at N15.25 trillion, reflecting a governance structure that consumes significant resources. Ministries, departments, agencies, and political overheads continue to limit fiscal space. Mr. Idakolo Gbolade of SD&D Capital Management acknowledges the budget’s ambition but warns that over 70 percent of capital expenditure may be carried over into 2026. This suggests that implementation bottlenecks remain unresolved. Borrowing to fund capital projects that are delayed or abandoned compounds fiscal inefficiency. Nigeria risks paying interest on infrastructure that exists only on paper. Until the cost of governance is structurally reduced, capital spending will struggle to deliver transformative impact, regardless of headline figures.

Security Spending at Scale, But Lacking Clarity

Security receives the largest sectoral allocation, N5.41 trillion, alongside a new national counterterrorism doctrine targeting all armed non-state actors. The administration argues, correctly, that without security, investment cannot thrive. On the contrary, Nigeria’s experience shows that security spending does not automatically translate into security outcomes. Over the years, allocations have risen while insecurity persists across multiple regions. The challenge is not merely funding, but accountability, coordination, and effectiveness. Without transparency in procurement and deployment, security budgets risk becoming opaque sinks for public funds, undermining the very growth assumptions embedded in the budget.

Shared Prosperity Under Pressure

Though the budget promises shared prosperity, citing allocations of N3.52 trillion for education and N2.48 trillion for health, alongside agricultural and infrastructure investments, and with the National Bureau of Statistics announcement that inflation has moderated, and growth has improved modestly. Yet for ordinary Nigerians, relief remains elusive. Food prices are high, transport costs elevated, and real incomes squeezed. Social sector spending still struggles to keep pace with population growth. Shared prosperity cannot remain an aspiration deferred to the future. It must translate into jobs, affordable food, functioning schools, accessible healthcare, and rising real incomes.

Borrowing Without Beneficiaries

At the 2025 IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings in Washington, D.C., global leaders again pledged to address developing countries’ debt burdens. But as Nigeria continues to issue Eurobonds, sukuk, and bilateral loans, a simple question demands attention: who benefits from all this borrowing? If the answer is not citizens, businesses, and future generations, then the debt is not development finance; it is deferred hardship.

When Deficits Become Destiny

The 2026 budget reflects an administration aware of Nigeria’s fiscal dysfunctions and eager to correct them. The language of discipline, digitisation, and delivery signals intent. But credibility is not declared; it is earned. A deficit-driven budget that leans heavily on borrowing, struggles with revenue realism, and carries unresolved execution gaps places Nigeria on a narrow fiscal path. If borrowing is decisively tied to self-liquidating projects, transparency restored, and governance costs reduced, the budget could mark a turning point. If not, it risks confirming a grim truth as Nigeria is financing today by mortgaging tomorrow. Until debt stops crowding out development and revenue begins to fund governance rather than merely service it, deficits will no longer be temporary tools. They will become destiny.

Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]

A new ₦50 charge on electronic money transfers above ₦10,000 is to take effect from Jan. 1, 2026, following preliminary system adjustments observed across several banking platforms ahead of the New Year.

CBN

The levy, tied to government stamp duty regulations, is separate from and in addition to regular bank transfer fees already borne by customers.

Industry sources told the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) on Friday in Lagos that while existing bank charges would remain unchanged, customers initiating qualifying transfers would now pay both their normal transfer fees and the extra ₦50 stamp duty per transaction.

In a major shift to the current practice, the ₦50 levy which was previously borne by receivers of funds will now be paid by senders.

This implies that for every electronic transfer above ₦10,000, the sender will bear the full cost of the stamp duty alongside the standard transaction fees charged by their bank.

According to the emerging charge structure sighted on some banking platforms, the new levy applies only to transactions above ₦10,000 and will be deducted on a per-transaction basis.

Transfers below ₦10,000 remain exempt, while movements of funds between accounts owned by the same individual within the same bank are also not affected.

Analysts, however, warn that for millions of Nigerians who rely on frequent small-value transfers to meet daily needs, the additional government charge, layered on existing banking costs, could deepen financial strain for households already operating on thin margins.

Customers have in recent weeks raised concern over what they describe as a steady rise in transaction-related deductions, noting that the quiet rollout of the new ₦50 levy has heightened anxiety.

They observed that January is traditionally one of the most financially challenging months for households, driven by school fees, rent renewals, food inflation and post-holiday obligations, and questioned the timing and limited public communication around a change that directly affects routine financial activity.

Digital transfers have become central to everyday life in Nigeria, underpinning business settlements, informal trade, family remittances and emergency support.

With more than 70 per cent of transfers estimated to fall below ₦20,000, financial experts say the cumulative impact of a ₦50 charge on each qualifying transaction, when combined with existing bank fees, will significantly raise monthly transaction costs for individuals and micro and small enterprises.

For many Nigerians, the concern extends beyond the levy itself to the broader pattern of rising financial pressure that has eroded household resilience over time.

They point to the combined weight of escalating food prices, high transportation costs, stagnant incomes and a range of service charges that, in their view, “pile up quietly in the background”.

Stakeholders fear that introducing an additional government-backed charge at the start of the year, and doing so with minimal public sensitisation, may reinforce perceptions that more cost-heavy policies could be introduced in 2026 without adequate engagement or clarity.

“Why is such a significant cost being quietly introduced at the start of the year? Why was there no widespread announcement or public sensitisation? And what other policy shifts might be coming that Nigerians have not yet been informed about?” one Lagos-based small business owner asked in a chat with NAN.

As Jan. 1 approaches, many households say they are bracing for yet another financial burden in an economy where, for them, every naira already feels stretched beyond its limit.

They called on relevant authorities and regulators to provide clear guidance on the new charge structure, explain its legal basis, and ensure that customers are adequately informed about how it will affect their daily transactions.

Despite being the global epicentre of mobile money innovation, Sub-Saharan Africa remains home to tens of millions of adults who do not own a mobile money account. A new World Bank report disclosed.

According to the Global Findex Database 2025, Sub-Saharan Africa is widely celebrated as the birthplace of mobile money, a technology that has transformed how people send, receive, save, and borrow money using basic mobile phones.

“Yet, the region still accounts for one of the world’s largest concentrations of adults without mobile money accounts,” it said.

The report shows that while about 40 percent of adults in Sub-Saharan Africa had a mobile money account in 2024, up sharply from 27 percent in 2021, roughly 60 percent still do not.

The reasons, the report argues, are less about lack of awareness and more about deep structural barriers that continue to exclude large segments of the population.

According to the report, a lack of money is the single most common barrier to mobile money account ownership in the region.

For many low-income households, irregular earnings, subsistence livelihoods, and dependence on cash-based transactions reduce the perceived value of maintaining an account, even when services are widely available.

This challenge is compounded by affordability issues. Transaction fees, charges for cashing out, and the cost of maintaining an active SIM card can deter the poorest adults, reinforcing the perception that mobile money is not designed for very small or infrequent transactions.

In Nigeria, the World Bank Group has announced an estimate that 139 million in 2025 will be living in poverty despite the reforms of the federal government.

Mobile phone ownership gaps persist

Mobile money cannot function without a mobile phone, yet phone ownership itself remains uneven. The report finds that 40 percent of adults now own a mobile money account, up from 27 percent in 2021.

And those who do not have a financial account also do not own a mobile phone of any kind.

This creates a double barrier: adults who are financially excluded are often also digitally excluded.

Among those without phones, the cost of the device is cited as the primary obstacle. While basic phones are more affordable than smartphones, the report notes that even these can be out of reach for the poorest households, especially in rural areas. Without addressing device affordability, efforts to expand mobile money risk leaving behind the very groups they aim to serve.

The report disclosed that even when phones and accounts are available, digital capability remains a challenge. The report finds that only about half of mobile money account owners in Sub-Saharan Africa protect their phones with passwords, compared with much higher shares in other regions.

Limited digital literacy raises concerns about fraud, mistaken transfers, and scams, which in turn undermines trust in mobile financial services.

Trust issues are further reinforced by negative user experiences. Only about half of the adults in the region who sent money to the wrong person using mobile money reported getting it back, according to the report. Such experiences can discourage first-time users and lead dormant users to abandon their accounts.

A large untapped opportunity

Despite these challenges, the report points to a significant opportunity. In Sub-Saharan Africa, about a quarter of adults without accounts already own a mobile phone, have official ID, and have a SIM card registered in their own name, meaning they have all the prerequisites for mobile money adoption.

“Closing the gap will require coordinated action: reducing the cost of devices, expanding ID coverage, strengthening consumer protection, and designing low-cost products that reflect the financial realities of poor and rural households,” the World Bank argues.

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